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Introduction 
 
 
Yemen: GCC Roadmap to Nowhere 
Elite Bargaining and Political Infighting Block a Meaningful Transition 
Mareike Transfeld 
The transformation process in Yemen, as initiated and defined by the roadmap of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is frequently praised as a model for a peaceful tran-
sition. Despite some delay, formally speaking, the process appears to be on track. It 
has just entered a new phase with the conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference 
(NDC) at the end of January 2014 and the establishment of the constitutional drafting 
committee in March. While the results of the NDC present a good basis for the future 
Yemeni order, increased violent conflict on the ground is casting doubt on the way 
ahead. Rivaling elite factions continue to exploit the transition process for their own 
political and economic interests. This has blocked the emergence of a more participa-
tory system. To support a meaningful transition, Germany and the European Union 
should pressure the transitional government to address the legitimate grievances of 
the popular movements that are challenging the rule of the old elites. 
 
The GCC roadmap, signed in November 
2011 after 10 months of popular protest, 
initiated a transfer of power from then-
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to his vice 
president. The agreement also mandated a 
reform of the fragmented Yemeni security 
apparatus and the NDC to resolve the coun-
try’s internal conflicts. However, rather 
than being a process that includes all social 
and political groups in the country, the 
transition in Yemen has evolved into a 
power struggle within the elite. 
Since the transfer of power, Yemeni poli-
tics have been moving toward a tri-polar 
elite constellation: interim President Abd 
Rabbu Mansur Hadi; the alliance of the 
Ahmar family and General Ali Mohsin; 
and the family of former President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh (see Box 1, p. 2). At the heart 
of the conflict between the three alliances 
stands access to the state’s institutions and 
its resources, which serve the various fac-
tions by securing their economic interests 
and maintaining patronage networks that 
consolidate their power. 
The international community has been 
driving and monitoring the transition pro-
cess, motivated mainly by its interest in the 
country’s stability. Given Yemen’s depend-
ence on foreign aid and the fear of discipli-
nary measures based on UN resolution 2140 
of late February 2014, which threatens 
sanctions against individuals who obstruct 
or undermine the transition process, no 
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 Box 1: Key figures 
 
SALEH ALLIANCE: 
Ali Abdullah Saleh: President until 
February 2012; Secretary-General, GPC. 
Ahmed Ali: Son of Ali Abdullah Saleh; 
until 2013 Commander of Republican 
Guards. 
Ali Mohsin: Same tribe as the Saleh 
family and Commander of First Ar-
mored Division. Defected to opposition 
in March 2011. Now forms alliance with 
Al-Ahmar family. 
 
HADI ALLIANCE: 
Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi: Interim 
President since 2012, Vice-President 
(1994–2012); member of GPC. 
Abdulkarim al-Eryani: Former Foreign 
Minister and Prime Minister, Advisor to 
Ali Abdullah Saleh; member of GPC. 
Muslim Brotherhood leadership of Islah 
as well as the leaders of other opposi-
tional parties, such as the Yemen 
Socialist Party. 
 
AL-AHMAR ALLIANCE: 
Abdullah al-Ahmar (died in 2007): 
Supreme sheikh of Hashid tribal feder-
ation and President of Islah party. 
Sadeq al-Ahmar: Eldest son of Abdullah 
al-Ahmar; supreme sheikh of Hashid.  
Hamid al-Ahmar: Son of Abdullah 
al-Ahmar, business tycoon, and-high 
ranking member of Islah. 
 
elite faction can afford to openly obstruct 
the process. While the elites profess support 
for the transitional process, they continue 
to use their networks in tribes, political 
parties, state institutions, and the media to 
claim legitimacy, delegitimize competitors, 
and curry favor with external sponsors. Due 
to these elite maneuvers, the implementa-
tion of the GCC initiative has been delayed, 
with negotiations in the NDC dragging on 
for months in a volatile political environ-
ment and increasing insecurity. As a con-
sequence, the term of transitional President 
Hadi – and with it the transitional period – 
was extended for another year on 25 Janu-
ary 2014. 
The different elite coalitions have differ-
ent interests with regard to the implemen-
tation of the GCC initiative. A successful 
formal implementation is in the interest 
of President Hadi and his loyalists, as it will 
guarantee the support of the international 
community – on which they mainly rely – 
and favors their drive to occupy political 
positions and control state institutions. 
However, despite Hadi’s professed support 
for political change and his close coopera-
tion with the international community, 
neither comprehensive reforms nor an im-
mediate implementation of the NDC results 
can be expected, as persisting patronage 
networks and tribal loyalties render reforms 
in state institutions difficult. 
The Ahmar family and Ali Mohsin are 
not aiming for office themselves. Rather, 
they are trying to use the GCC roadmap to 
ensure the establishment of a system that 
functions to their advantage. This includes 
their business interests in the telecommu-
nication and oil sectors. Yet, in the course 
of the violent conflicts in northern Yemen, 
the Ahmar family has lost much tribal sup-
port, and thus political influence. 
Ex-President Saleh and his supporters are 
interested in seeing the implementation of 
the GCC initiative fail, as this would legiti-
mize them vis-à-vis the transitional presi-
dent. The group behind Saleh is aiming for 
political offices, as their economic interests 
are related to the control of the military. 
Although the results of the NDC prohibit 
any individual who has served in the mili-
tary in the last 10 years to run for the presi-
dency, it cannot be ruled out that this group 
will attempt to nominate Ahmed Ali – 
Saleh’s son and former commander of the 
Republican Guards – as a candidate in the 
presidential elections scheduled for 2015. 
With instability increasing, a comeback of 
the Saleh family and a partial restoration 
of the pre-2011 regime continues to be a 
possibility. 
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 The Saleh regime before 2011 
Before the 2011 uprising, the Yemeni 
regime was based on an alliance between 
the Saleh and Ahmar families. The Saleh 
family and members of Saleh’s tribe, the 
Sanhan, were high-ranking military officers 
who collectively controlled the security 
apparatus. Through their positions within 
the military and within the military-con-
trolled Yemen Economic Corporation 
(YECO), they were able to secure vast eco-
nomic gains. YECO is the country’s main 
importer of food, among other things, and 
a major player in the Yemeni economy. On 
the political level, this group was (and is) 
represented by the General People’s Con-
gress (GPC), which had been the main 
ruling party for decades. As a non-ideo-
logical entity, it was designed to channel 
patronage and coopt influential social 
actors, including potential opponents. 
The Ahmar family derives its influence 
from its leading position in the Hashid 
tribal federation, the most powerful tribal 
coalition in Yemen. The Ahmar family has 
established one of the biggest business em-
pires in Yemen, the al-Ahmar Group, with 
interests in crude oil, telecommunication, 
import and export, and tourism markets. 
Sadeq al-Ahmar, the eldest of 10 Ahmar 
brothers, is currently the supreme sheikh 
of the Hashid, while the younger Hamid 
al-Ahmar has emerged as a prominent busi-
nessman and politician. 
The Ahmars are closely linked to Islah, a 
party comprised of the Yemeni branch of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, as well as 
conservative tribesmen. Islah was created 
by northern elites after unification of South 
and North Yemen in 1990. Throughout the 
1990s, Islah remained a close ally of Saleh’s 
GPC, which ruled Yemen from 1997 until 
2011. 
The initial cracks within this elite coali-
tion emerged when President Saleh began 
to groom his son, Ahmed Ali, as successor 
to the presidency in the early 2000s. Saleh’s 
strategy to marginalize potential competi-
tors to his son and to centralize power in 
the hands of his immediate family gave rise 
to discord between the elite factions. By 
weakening Ali Mohsin militarily, Saleh 
alienated his long-term confidant, the 
commander of the first armored division, 
who hails from the same tribe as the Saleh 
family. The fissure between Saleh and the 
Ahmar family began to widen in the run-up 
to the 2006 presidential elections. Hamid 
al-Ahmar was the first member of the inner 
circle to openly defect from Saleh and lead 
the Islah party in its vocal opposition to the 
government. It was at this time that Islah 
fully joined the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), 
a strong alliance of five opposition parties. 
Changing elite coalitions 
As the first step of the GCC roadmap, an 
interim government that was equally com-
posed of GPC and JMP representatives was 
sworn in in December 2011. In February 
2012, Hadi was endorsed by both parties as 
presidential candidate and confirmed in a 
public vote without competition. The oppo-
sition’s increased political influence was 
now reflected in the unity government, 
with Hadi as the transitional president 
building a new (if weak) pole between the 
two equally strong elite alliances. At the 
same time, the relatives of Saleh and Ali 
Mohsin retained their positions within 
the military. 
Yet, the GCC roadmap mandated a 
restructuring of the security apparatus, 
with the goal of reorganizing the military 
and security services under the Ministry 
of Defense and Ministry of Interior, respec-
tively. With this restructuring process, the 
power balance within the elite was bound 
to change, as it implicitly aimed at remov-
ing Saleh’s relatives from the armed forces. 
Indeed, it led to the weakening of the Saleh 
faction, whereas Hadi and the Ahmar–Ali 
Mohsin alliance were initially strength-
ened. 
Although Hadi, who was responsible 
for the implementation of the military 
reforms, faced resistance from individual 
officers and troops concerning the person-
nel changes within the military, he was 
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 supported in the implementation by UN 
Special Advisor on Yemen, Jamal Benomar. 
While keeping Ali Mohsin in place as a 
counterweight to Ahmed Ali, who remained 
in charge of the well-trained and well-
equipped Republican Guards, Hadi began 
to remove Saleh loyalists and family mem-
bers from their positions in the security 
apparatus. In August 2012, a series of 
presidential decrees removed troops from 
the command of Ahmed Ali and, to a lesser 
extent, Ali Mohsin, thus weakening both 
men from below. Only after these measures 
did Hadi move to replace both Ahmed Ali 
and Ali Mohsin. However, while the former 
was dispatched to become Yemen’s ambas-
sador to the United Arab Emirates, Ali 
Mohsin was appointed presidential advisor 
on military affairs. Although he formally 
lost his position in the army, he has not 
only remained in the country but has also 
indirectly retained his influence among 
many officers and troops previously under 
his command. 
Through the restructuring of the mili-
tary, Saleh and his supporters – represent-
ing the first center of power – lost influence 
on the top level of the institution. The family 
of the former president still retains support 
among the troops, however. This is particu-
larly true for units previously led by Ahmed 
Ali, which had been paid, trained, and 
treated better than the rest of the armed 
forces. The defection of the Ahmars also 
affected the tribal support base of the 
Salehs, yet the former president retains the 
loyalty of various tribal leaders, some of 
whom are intermarried with the family or 
are members of the GPC. Also, as Saleh has 
remained Secretary-General of the GPC, the 
party still serves him and his supporters 
as a vehicle to exercise political influence. 
Increasingly, however, the party has 
become divided between die-hard Saleh 
loyalists and a current that would prefer 
if the new president took the helm of the 
party. The former, also referred to as the 
GPC “hawks,” accuse President Hadi of 
colluding with the international commu-
nity and the former opposition. Military 
restructuring, in their view, does not aim 
at turning the military into a truly national 
institution but is geared to allocate more 
power to President Hadi himself, as evi-
denced by his stacking of the armed forces 
with supporters from his southern home 
governorate, Abyan. 
Hadi and his supporters in the GPC – the 
“dove” faction – form the second center 
of power and profess to offer compromise 
with other forces. Supporters of the dove 
faction in the past played an important 
role in negotiating with the opposition. It 
does not come as a surprise that they have 
formed an alliance with the leadership 
of the JMP. Although this elite faction is 
rather weak in terms of tribal and military 
support, it enjoys the backing of the inter-
national community. The GCC roadmap has 
served to legitimize their claim to political 
power, and thus this group has gained the 
most since the signing of the power-trans-
fer deal. They have also come out as the 
strongest proponents of the GCC initiative. 
The Ahmar family, Ali Mohsin, and Islah 
form the third center of political power. 
The Ahmar family was unaffected by the 
military restructuring. In particular, they 
saw to it that many Saleh supporters were 
purged from positions in the state appa-
ratus and replaced by members of Islah. 
Potentially, their interest to retain power 
by means of patronage and tribal loyalty 
may put them on a collision course with 
the forces around Hadi that attempt to 
arrogate more authority to the state insti-
tutions that they control. Since the signing 
of the GCC initiative, the Ahmar family and 
Ali Mohsin have scaled down their direct 
presence on the political stage and instead 
pursued their interest through Islah via the 
implementation of the roadmap. 
The rise of identity politics 
Although access to political power and 
resources is at the heart of the conflict 
between Yemen’s different regions, the 
elites frame the conflicts with sectarian 
language in an attempt to instigate con-
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 flicts between their respective Zaidi and 
Shafi’i supporters (see Box 2). 
This has been the case in the north in 
particular, where the government has been 
engaged in a conflict with the so-called 
Houthis. Motivated by their demand for 
political participation and economic devel-
opment as well as the defense of their Zaidi 
religious tradition, the Houthis waged 
six rounds of war against the government 
between 2004 and 2010. Since their fall 
from power in 2011, the pro-Saleh hawk 
faction of the GPC has discovered the 
Houthis as potential allies. Toward the end 
of the NDC, a loose and informal alliance 
between the two groups emerged. On the 
popular level, Zaidi centers within the capi-
tal that supported Saleh during the 2011 
uprising have become sympathetic to the 
plight of the Houthi movement. The Ahmar 
family, the Hashid tribes allied with it, and 
General Ali Mohsin, on the other hand, 
have long since maintained links to Sunni 
Islamist currents. 
As a consequence, tensions between 
Hashid tribes and the Houthis have repeat-
edly escalated into violent clashes in the 
Ahmar stronghold of Amran, a mere 50 km 
north of Sanaa. In the spring of 2014, the 
Houthi movement reached the outskirts of 
Sanaa, causing widespread fears about the 
possibility of the violent conflict entering 
the capital. The Houthi movement has 
aimed at weakening the Ahmar family and 
Islah by gaining territorial control, which 
it could then use for leverage on the politi-
cal level. In the course of the conflict, the 
Ahmars, who are widely perceived as being 
corrupt and following their own interests, 
lost the support of a significant number 
of Hashid tribes, who began to support 
the Houthi movement. Besides facilitating 
tribal arbitration, until recently Hadi had 
not taken serious measures to stop the 
Houthis’ advancement. In late April 2014 
the Houthis agreed to negotiate with the 
government. Hadi’s strategy appears to 
have been to use the conflict to weaken the 
Ahmar family, after Saleh and his support-
ers had already been weakened. Yet, with  
Box 2: Shafi’is and Zaidis 
 
Whereas central and southern Yemen 
predominantly adhere to the Shafi’i 
school of Sunni Islam, between one-
third and half of the population of Yemen 
are (nominal) adherents of Zaidism, a 
branch of Shiite Islam distinct from 
the version practiced in Iran. According 
to the Zaidi tradition, political rule is 
restricted to the class of Sayyids, who 
are considered to be descendants of 
Prophet Mohammed. The 1962 revolu-
tion overthrew the theocratic rule of 
the Sayyids and established a republic 
in which they were no longer privileged. 
Saleh and his predecessors, as well as 
influential tribal leaders, had no inter-
est in emphasizing this separate reli-
gious identity, which restricts power 
to a class they were not a part of, and 
which legitimizes rebellion against un-
just leaders. Rather, they encouraged 
the spread of strict interpretations of 
Sunni Islam propagated in particular by 
Saudi Arabia, such as Salafism. Resent-
ment against the influence of such 
ideologies, paired with social marginali-
zation, has prompted resistance against 
the central government in the northern 
Saada province since the early 2000s. The 
resistance has since taken on the char-
acter of a Zaidi revivalist movement, 
named after its first leader, Hussein 
Badreddin al-Houthi. 
 
Hashid tribes turning against their leader, 
Saleh supporters have profited from the 
recent developments, as they have weakened 
their strongest opponent. 
The National Dialogue Conference 
Interim President Hadi has had an interest 
in pushing forward the implementation of 
the GCC roadmap. Besides the restructuring 
of the security apparatus, the NDC was the 
second major component of the GCC road-
map’s approach. Ostensibly, the goal of the 
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 NDC was to bring together the various con-
flicting groups and establish a national 
consensus. The conclusion of the NDC on 
21 January 2014 was internationally cel-
ebrated as a success of the transition process. 
Undeniably, the conference was an 
achievement, in that it brought together 
conflicting parties, elites, and members of 
grassroots movements, such as the youth, 
al-Hirak, the Houthis, and women (for more 
detail, see SWP Comments 23/2013). Also, 
the results of the individual working groups 
(Southern Issue, Sa’ada Issue, Transitional 
Justice, State-Building, Good Governance, 
Military/Security, Special Entities, Rights/ 
Freedom, and Development) provide a good 
basis for the new constitution to be drafted. 
Yet, the conference was dominated by 
the old elites (GPC: 112 out of 565 seats; 
Islah: 50 seats). The dominance of Hadi’s 
supporters in vital committees in particular 
ensured that the results of the NDC would 
be favorable to the transitional president 
and the international community. While 
the so-called independent youth had a great 
impact on the outcomes of the NDC, some 
of their more progressive demands – such 
as a transitional justice law and a reform 
of the telecommunication sector, which 
would have touched on the interests of the 
old elites – were blocked by the GPC hawks. 
Also, the demands of the representatives 
of the southern movement were frequently 
ignored. The southern movement, common-
ly referred to as al-Hirak (Arabic for “The 
Movement”) had begun calling for civil 
disobedience and protests against what it 
perceived to be a northern occupation since 
2007. Pent-up grievances deriving from the 
general political and economic marginali-
zation of the formerly independent south 
boosted al-Hirak. It developed into a potent 
protest movement demanding the resolu-
tion of land disputes in the south, the re-
instatement and compensation of forcibly 
retired military officers and state bureau-
crats, and the release of political prisoners. 
But as these demands have not yet been 
addressed, it has continued to demand 
secession. 
With regard to the southern question in 
particular, the NDC was not able to come to 
a consensus. Federalism was brought up as 
a solution to the various conflicts the coun-
try is facing, particularly the secessionist 
conflict with al-Hirak. The question of the 
federal regions was the greatest bone of 
contention for the delegates, as it touched 
directly on the distribution of power and 
resources. All three elite factions vying 
for power in Sanaa share similar attitudes 
toward the south: secession is a red line. 
This is not only because the political elite is 
overwhelmingly northern, but also because 
separation along the pre-1990 borders would 
leave the northern rump state with little oil. 
With no solution to the southern issue in 
sight during the NDC, popular confidence 
in a positive outcome decreasing, and esca-
lating violence across the country, Presi-
dent Hadi presented a document to the 
NDC in late December 2013 stipulating that 
all parties agreed to a just solution for the 
south, but that the exact form of the federal 
structure would be determined later. He 
then established a committee outside the 
NDC that adopted a controversial six-region 
solution. Thus, an open failure of the NDC 
on this issue was avoided by bypassing the 
NDC and imposing the solution preferred 
by the Hadi alliance. 
The adopted solution can be seen as an 
achievement in two ways: it secured the 
vital interests of the three elite groups and 
served to maintaining the support of the 
international community for Hadi’s group. 
However, the solution has not been accepted 
by most of the factions making up the frag-
mented al-Hirak movement. The Houthi 
movement has likewise expressed opposi-
tion and criticized that the decision was 
taken outside of the NDC. Some GPC hawks 
appear to oppose the conclusion out of 
principle. Thus, violent conflict in the 
north and protests in the south are con-
tinuing. 
SWP Comments 20 
May 2014 
6 
 The protest movements and the 
GCC roadmap’s shortcomings 
The conclusion of the NDC did not achieve 
its goal to reconcile the conflicting groups. 
Also, the government in Sanaa undertook 
few trust-building measures. Thus, the 
grassroots movements continue to distrust 
it and rely on protests and violence as strat-
egies to attain their goals. So far, none of 
the immediate grievances that drove the 
2011 protests have been addressed, in-
cluding extreme poverty, high unemploy-
ment, and widespread corruption. Even 
though grassroots movements played an 
important role in the 2011 uprising, they 
have had little political influence since 
then, with the transitional period being 
dominated by the old elites. This did not 
happen by coincidence but can be traced 
back to the approach chosen with the GCC 
initiative. 
What had begun as small protests in 
January 2011 developed into a full-fledged, 
countrywide, popular uprising that lasted 
for 10 months. In absolute terms, of all the 
countries participating in the Arab Spring, 
Yemen had the largest protests by far. The 
new popular protest movement encouraged 
by the Arab Spring occupied public squares 
in all major cities and demanded the 
overthrow of the regime. United by their 
demands for political change, al-Hirak and 
the Houthis quickly declared solidarity 
with the “youth revolution,” organized 
protests in their home governorates, and 
joined the main protest square in Yemen’s 
capital, Sanaa. 
The opposition parties and those mem-
bers of the political elite who had been at 
odds with Saleh used the opportunity to 
put pressure on the regime. In March 2011, 
after more than 50 protesters had been 
killed in the capital, General Ali Mohsin 
and Sadeq al-Ahmar formally defected to 
the opposition. As a consequence, the pro-
tests became better organized and grew 
even further in size. Despite the weight 
that the JMP and the elites added to the 
independent protest movement, many of 
the activists viewed the parties’ and elites’ 
participation with skepticism. Perceived 
as part of the same regime they were trying 
to bring down, activists saw the elites as 
hijacking the revolution. 
In April 2011, the GCC – backed by the 
UN, the US, and the EU – put forward what 
became known as the GCC initiative to 
resolve the crisis and initiate a peaceful 
transfer of power. By October 2011, inter-
national pressure on Saleh to sign the road-
map proposed by the GCC mounted, with 
both the UN and the EU threatening to im-
pose sanctions. After securing legal immu-
nity for himself and his closest supporters, 
and after the JMP agreed on vice presi-
dent and long-term GPC member Hadi to 
become interim president, the deal was 
finally signed in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, 
in November 2011. 
To negotiate the transfer of power, the 
external mediators had turned to estab-
lished leaders and political bodies, namely 
the GPC (and thus Saleh) and the JMP (and 
thus the Ahmar family and Ali Mohsin). 
The youth movement that had had a cru-
cial role in the uprising was ignored. The 
Houthi movement and al-Hirak were like-
wise excluded from these negotiations. 
With their reliance only on the old elites, 
the sponsors of the GCC roadmap sup-
ported the maintaining of the old system, 
whereas the street lost its leverage in poli-
tics. On the elite level, as detailed above, 
the GCC initiative enabled a reshuffling 
of political power and access to state 
resources. 
The UN and the initiative’s Western 
sponsors claim that the international 
engagement aims at achieving a democratic 
transition in Yemen. Above all, however, it 
is the attempt to contain the threat of the 
further destabilization of fragile Yemen, 
which would allow Al-Qaeda on the Arabian 
Peninsula to expand its already worrisome 
presence, that drives international engage-
ment. Rather than a genuinely inclusive 
system, the priority thus is to achieve politi-
cal stability and to maintain territorial 
integrity. 
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 Conclusion 
The GCC initiative has effected a superficial 
transition on the political level and a fragile 
balance between three camps vying to max-
imize their grip on power. By putting pro-
cess before substance, the implementation 
of the roadmap is, however, liable to lead 
neither to democracy nor to stability. The 
international community should acknowl-
edge that, despite the conclusion of the NDC, 
the conflicts in the country are far from 
resolved. Further dialogue must address 
the conflict between the three political fac-
tions and work to achieve a buy-in from 
the Houthis, al-Hirak, the youth movement, 
and other civil society actors. 
Indeed, with UNSC resolution 2140, the 
international community has sent the time-
ly signal that obstruction of the transition 
will not be tolerated. Yet, it should be care-
ful when identifying the source of obstruc-
tion and avoid giving carte blanche to 
actors who attempt to bend the process to 
their own ends. Rather, European facilita-
tors of the GCC initiative should pressure 
the transitional government to build trust 
among the various groups by answering 
their legitimate grievances. Implementing 
those results of the NDC that were, in fact, 
consensual would be the most obvious start-
ing point. Given the state of the Yemeni 
security forces and the balance of military 
power, only compromise with the Houthis 
and al-Hirak can restore stability. Germany, 
being very popular among Yemenis, could 
play an important role as a mediator that 
is perceived as neutral. Such mediation 
would be of particular importance between 
northern elites and the southern move-
ment. 
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